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In the fifth century B.C., Euripides addressed “those who patiently endure 
long illnesses” as follows:
I hate the men who would prolong their lives 
By foods and drinks and charms of magic art 
Perverting nature’s course to keep off death 
They ought, when they no longer serve the land 
To quit this life, and clear the way for youth.1
These lines express a view again stirring controversy: that those of 
the elderly who are irreversibly ill, whose lives can be continued only 
with substantial medical support, ought not be given treatment; instead, 
their lives should be brought to an end. It should be recognized, as one 
contemporary political figure is said to have put it, that they have a “duty 
to die.”2
Although this controversy achieves a new urgency as pressures for 
containment of health care costs escalate, the notion is hardly new that 
there is a time for the ill elderly to die, a time at which they are obligated 
to bring their lives to an end or allow others to do so. A number of 
conspicuous voices in the historical tradition have advanced such a notion,
*  I would like to thank Bruce Landesman, Leslie Francis, Tim Smeeding, Dan Wikler, 
Tom Reed, Virgil Aldrich, and the participants at a Health, Technology, and Environment 
Working Group Conference on Age Rationing in Health Care, Alta, Utah, September 
1985. Some material for this paper is drawn from an earlier paper, “Choosing the Time 
to Die: The Ethics and Economics of Suicide in Old Age,” forthcoming in Geriatrics and 
Ethics: Value Conflicts for the 21st Century, ed. I. Lawson, S. Spicker, and S. Ingman (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1987).
1. Euripides, Suppliants 1109, as quoted by [pseudo-] Plutarch in “A Letter of Condolence 
to Apollonius,” 110C, in Plutarch’s Moralia, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (London: William 
Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1928), vol. 2, p. 153.
2. Colorado’s Governor Richard D. Lamm was widely (mis)quoted in March 1984 as 
claiming that the terminally ill elderly “have a duty to die,” engendering extremely vigorous 
controversy. Lamm’s own account of what he actually did say appears in New Republic for 
August 27, 1984, as well as in a variety of speech and press corrections around this time.
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variously recommending denial of treatment, euthanasia, or socially assisted 
“rational” suicide as a means of bringing it about. Plato, for instance, 
said that the chronically ill or disabled patient ought to refuse medical 
treatment and, if he cannot return to work, simply die.3 In Thomas 
More’s Utopia, the priests and magistrates are to urge the person who 
suffers a painful incurable illness “to make the decision not to nourish 
such a painful disease any longer” and to “deliver himself from the 
scourge and imprisonment of living or Jet others release him.”4 Nietzsche 
claimed that the physician should administer a “fresh dose of disgust,” 
rather than a prescription, to the sick man who “continues to vegetate 
in a state of cowardly dependence upon doctors” and who thus becomes 
a “parasite” on society; it is “indecent,” he says, “to go on living.”5
Not only have individual thinkers recommended such practices, but 
a variety of primitive and historical societies appear to have engaged in 
them. Although the anthropological data may not be fully reliable, there 
seems to be evidence of a variety of senicide practices, variously involving 
abandonment, direct killing, or socially enforced suicide. The Eskimo, 
for instance, are reported to have practiced suicide in old age “not merely 
to be rid of a life that is no longer a pleasure, but also to relieve their 
nearest relations of the trouble they give them.”6 The early Japanese are 
said to have taken their elderly to a mountaintop to die.7 Various migratory 
American Indian tribes abandoned their infirm members by the side of 
the trail. At least while the island of Ceos was under siege, the Greeks 
there required persons reaching the age of sixty-five to commit suicide. 
Except within the school headed by Hippocrates, Greek physicians ap­
parently made euthanasia or assistance in suicide available to those whose 
illnesses they could not cure, and there is some evidence that hemlock 
was developed for this purpose.8 Greek and Roman Stoics— most notably
3. Plato, Republic 3.406C.
4. Thomas More, Utopia, bk. 2, “Their Care of the Sick and Euthanasia,” trans.
H. V. S. Ogden (Northbrook, 111.: AHM, 1949), p. 57.
5. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Twilight of the Idols, sec. 36, in The Complete Works of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, vol. 16, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), p. 
88.
6. See Alexander H. Leighton and Charles C. Hughes, “Notes on Eskimo Patterns of 
Suicide,” Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 11 (1955): 327-38, for a description of suicide 
practices from Yuit Eskimo informants on St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, and a survey of 
the literature on Eskimo suicide generally.
7. This practice is movingly depicted in the Imamura film The Ballad of Narayama, but 
there remains considerable controversy concerning whether the practice in fact has historical 
roots or is the product of legend imported at a later period.
8. The Hippocratic Oath reflects opposition to this practice on the part of a minority 
school. See Ludwig Edelstein, “The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation, and Interpretation,” 
in Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1943), and in Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein, ed. Owsei 
and C. Lillian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967). Also see Danielle 
Gourevitch, “Suicide among the Sick in Classical Antiquity,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 
43 (1969): 501-18.
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Seneca— recommended suicide as the responsible act of the wise man, 
who ought not assign overly great importance to mere life itself but, 
rather, achieve the disengagement and wisdom required to end his own 
life at the appropriate time. Of course, not all of these practices have 
been humane, either in their initial intent or in their final outcome. 
Although the early Nazi euthanasia program known as T4, which practiced 
active termination of the lives of chronically ill, debilitated, or retarded 
Aryans, was advertised as a benefit to these persons as well as to the state, 
it became the training ground for concentration camp personnel.9 But 
although practices which range from recommending refusal of medical 
treatment to encouraging suicide to deliberate, involuntary killing may 
seem to differ sharply in their ethical characteristics, there is nevertheless 
an important, central similarity: they are all the practices of societies 
which communicate to their members that when they reach advanced 
old age or become irreversibly ill, it is time to die, and that they have an 
obligation to acquiesce or cooperate in bringing this about. The question 
to be explored here, in the light of current issues concerning distributive 
justice in health care, is whether there is any moral warrant at all to this 
underlying view and, if so, precisely what consequences this would have 
for the health care of the aged.
THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE AGED
In contemporary society, a discomforting set of economic facts brings 
this issue into prominence. Health care use by the aged constitutes a 
major component of medical spending and exacerbates that scarcity of 
medical resources which generates distributive dilemmas in the first place. 
People reaching old age, and especially those entering extreme old age, 
are people for whom late-life dependency has or may become a reality, 
for whom medical care expenses are likely to escalate, and for whom 
needs for custodial and nursing care will increase. Three out of four 
deaths of persons of all ages in the United States occur as a result of 
degenerative diseases, and the proportion is much higher in old age;10 
the multiple infirmities and extended downhill course characteristic of 
these diseases greatly elevates the need for medical care. People over 
sixty-five use medical services at 3.5 times the rate of those below sixty- 
five.11 In 1981, the 11 percent of the population over sixty-five used 39.3 
percent of short-stay hospital days, and the 4.4 percent over seventy-five
9. See Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), and Robett J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and 
the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986) for accounts of the development 
of “euthanasia” policies under Hitler and their relationship to the mass extermination 
programs.
10. S. Jay Olshansky and A. Brian Ault, “The Fourth Stage of the Epidemiological 
Transition: The Age of Delayed Degenerative Diseases,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly I 
Health and Society 64 (1986): 355-91.
11. Norman Daniels, “Justice between Age Groups: Am I My Parents’ Keeper?” Milbank 
Memorial Fund Quarterly I Health and Society 61 (1983): 489—522, p. 515.
used 20.7 percent.12 There are now about six million octogenarians, and 
the federal government provides an estimated fifty-one billion dollars in 
transfers and services to them.13 People eighty years of age or older 
consume, on average, 77 percent more medical benefits than those between 
sixty-five and seventy-nine.14 Nursing home residents number about 1.5 
million, of whom 90 percent are sixty-five or over, at an average cost of 
twenty thousand dollars per year.15 Although only 4.7 percent of persons 
sixty-five or over are in nursing homes, rates rise with age. About 1 
percent of persons sixty-five to seventy-four are in nursing homes; of 
those seventy-five to eighty-four, 7 percent, and of those eighty-five and 
over, about 20 percent are in nursing homes on any given day.16 Even 
so, persons institutionalized represent a comparatively small fraction of 
the elderly suffering chronic illnesses and disabilities, and it is estimated 
that for every nursing home resident, there are two other people with 
equivalent disabilities in the community.17 One estimate suggests that 70 
percent of the elderly who need care rely on relatives to provide it.18 
Even if a person maintains functional independence into old age, the 
risk of becoming frail for a prolonged period is still high: for independent 
persons between sixty-five and sixty-nine, one study found, total life 
expectancy was 16.5 years, but “active life expectancy,” or the portion 
of the remaining years that were characterized by independence, was 
only 10.0 years, and the remaining 6.5 years were characterized by major 
functional impairment. Furthermore, this risk increases with age: persons 
who were independent at eighty-five were likely to spend 60 percent of 
their remaining 7.3 years requiring assistance.19 Expenditures are par­
ticularly large for those who are about to die. For instance, for Medicare 
enrollees in 1976, the average reimbursement for those in their last year 
of life was 6.2 times as large as for those who survived at least two years, 
and although those who died constituted only 5.9 percent of Medicare 
enrollees, they accounted for 27.9 percent of program expenditures.20 
While this figure is not confined to deaths among the elderly, a 1983
12. U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, Aging America, Trends and Projections 
(1984), p. 70.
13. B. B. Torrey, “The Visible Costs of the Invisible Aged: The Fiscal Implications 
of the Growth in the Very Old” (paper presented to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, New York, 1984), p. 1.
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. J. H. Schultz, The Economics of Aging (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 
1985), p. 140.
16. Ibid., p. 73.
17. J. W. Rowe, “Health Care of the Elderly,” New England Journal of Medicine 312 
(March 27, 1985): 831.
18. Schultz, p. 141.
19. Rowe, p. 828, quoting Sidney Katz et al., “Active Life Expectancy,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 309 (November 17, 1983): 1218-24.
20. James Lubitz and Ronald Prihoda, “The Use and Costs of Medicare Services in 
the Last 2 Years of Life,” Health Care Financing Review 5 (1984): 117—31, p. 119.
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survey of cancer deaths for Blue Cross/Blue Shield predicted that the 
average American who died of cancer in that year would incur more 
than twenty-two thousand dollars of illness-related expenses during the 
final year of life.21
Clearly, contemporary analogues of the practices of the historical 
and primitive societies mentioned above, ranging from refusal or denial 
of treatment to outright senicide and societally mandated suicide, would 
have pronounced impact upon the health care resources available for 
other persons in society. It is this that gives rise to the quite painful 
distributive question to be examined here. If scarcity precludes granting 
all persons within society all the care they need for all medical conditions 
which might arise, some persons or some conditions must be reduced 
or excluded from care. But if so, it is often held, those excluded should 
be the elderly ill: after all, the medical conditions from which they suffer 
are often extraordinarily expensive to treat; the prognosis, as age increases, 
is increasingly poor; and in any case they have already lived full life spans 
and had claim to a fair share of societal resources. It is this view, or 
constellation of views, which seems to underlie and motivate practices 
suggesting that there is a time for the elderly to die.
JUSTICE AND AGE RATIONING
If societal resources are insufficient to provide all the health care all 
persons in all medical conditions need, some sort of limiting distributive 
practice will of necessity emerge. Several recent writers have argued that 
rather than let the market control the distribution of health care, a rationally 
defended rationing policy can be developed under accepted principles 
of justice, and that this policy will justify rationing by age: old people 
should be the first to be excluded from medical care. However, assuming 
the underlying formal principle of justice to require that like cases and 
groups be treated alike, it is by no means initially clear that plausible 
material principles of justice will differentiate the elderly from other 
claimants for care. For instance, if an individual’s claim to care were 
taken to be a function of the contributions society may expect as a return 
on its investment in him, this might seem to support age rationing, 
disfavoring those no longer capable of making contributions; but of 
course the elderly have already made contributions, contributions which 
are in fact more secure than the still potential contributions of the young. 
Alternatively, it might be argued that the elderly have greater claims to 
care in virtue of their greater vulnerability, in virtue of the respect owed 
elders, or in virtue of the intrinsic value of old age. This sort of discussion, 
characteristic of many analyses of distributive justice, involves identifying 
the possible desert bases of claims to health care and then considering 
whether the elderly can satisfy these conditions as well as other age
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21. W. Hines, Chicago Sun-Times (February 9, 1983).
groups. If they can (which I think likely), policies which restrict the access 
of the elderly to health care must be seen as the product of simple age 
bias.
But an influential conceptual observation has been made by Norman 
Daniels.22 Most analyses of distributive justice, Daniels observes, assume 
that the elderly constitute one among a variety of age groups, including 
infants, adolescents, and the middle-aged, all of which compete for scarce 
resources in health care. But this, in Daniels’s view, is misleading; the 
elderly should be viewed as the same persons at a later stage of their 
lives. The mistake lies in considering distributive problems as problems 
in allocating resources among competing groups and among competing 
individuals, when they are more correctly understood as problems of 
allocating resources throughout the duration of lives. Given this conceptual 
shift, Daniels then employs Rawlsian strategies to determine just allocations 
of care. He considers what distributive policies prudential savers— the 
rational, self-interest-maximizing parties of the Rawlsian original 
position—would adopt if, unable to know their own medical conditions, 
genetic predispositions, physical susceptibilities, environmental situations, 
health maintenance habits, or ages, they must decide in advance on a 
spending plan, budgeting a fixed amount of medical care across their 
whole lives. He quite plausibly conjectures that prudential savers behind 
the veil of ignorance in this original position would choose, where scarcity 
obtains, to allocate a greater amount of resources to care and treatment 
required for conditions that occur earlier in life, from infancy through 
middle age, but not to underwrite treatment which would prolong life 
beyond its normal span. By freeing resources which might otherwise 
have been devoted to prolonging the lives of the elderly for use instead 
in the treatment of diseases which cause death or opportunity-restricting 
disability earlier in life, such a policy would maximize one’s chances of 
getting a reasonable amount of life within the normal species-typical, 
age-relative opportunity range. (Presumably, such a policy would not 
allocate extensive care to severely defective neonates, catastrophically 
and irreversibly damaged accident victims, or other persons whose medical 
prognoses are so dismal that the prospect of achieving even remotely 
normal species-typical age-relative opportunity is extremely poor. Thus, 
savings resulting from rationing care to the elderly would not be entirely 
consumed in treating the worst-off newborns or others in similarly hopeless 
circumstances, and the “black hole” problem would be avoided.) If this 
is a policy upon which prudential savers would agree, Daniels holds, it 
will show that— at least under scarcity conditions against a background 
of just institutions— age rationing is morally warranted for making al­
locations of health care.
But this leaves unanswered a crucial issue of application. If, in a 
situation of scarcity, a rationally defended rationing policy for health
22. Daniels, “Justice between Age Groups,” passim.
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care resources is more just than market control, and if the most just form 
of rationing for health care is rationing by age, this still does not determine 
what policies and practices for putting age rationing into effect are them­
selves just. Arguments for rationing are always morally incomplete without 
attention to the crucial details of precisely how such policies are to be 
given effect, since intolerable features of such policies may force recon­
sideration of the rationing strategy from the start. Thus, employing Dan­
iels’s Rawlsian strategy, it is necessary to consider what age-rationing 
policies rational self-interest maximizers in the original position would 
accept.
Independently of whatever merits it may have as an application of 
the Rawlsian conception of justice, Daniels’s strategy is intuitively attractive 
for assessing the moral justifiability of age rationing in health care. This 
is because those of us who are considering this issue— who would be 
prepared to develop policy requirements on the basis of these considerations 
and who would be governed by whatever policies might be devised— 
are effectively behind the “veil of ignorance” with respect to the specific 
events of our own aging and death. While Rawls claims that we can enter 
the original position any time simply by reasoning for principles of justice 
in accordance with the appropriate restrictions on not taking into account 
one’s own specific interests,23 such self-restriction is hardly necessary: 
when considering issues of justice with respect to aging and death, we 
are already there. It is of course true that most persons who are reasonably 
familiar with background medical and genetic information and who have 
some knowledge of their own ancestry, previous health history, and 
health maintenance habits are not completely ignorant of the probable 
circumstances of their own aging and death. Yet they are able to eliminate 
with certainty only a very few types and causes of death (e.g., specific 
hereditary diseases for which one is not at risk) and to assign rough 
probabilities to the likelihood of contracting the major killer diseases; 
even those with early symptoms of a disease syndrome cannot be sure 
that some other fatal event will not intervene. What they are not able to 
do is prospectively identify with certainty the actual cause of their own 
deaths or the precise events of a future terminal course. By and large, 
persons still in a position to consider the issue of health care age rationing 
for the elderly and to develop policy responses do not yet know when 
or how they will age and die. But we are all in this position, and we find 
ourselves obliged to evaluate policies and applications of age-rationing 
practices without knowing how^they will affect our own interests when 
the time comes. Yet despite the fact that we thus replicate the Rawlsian 
original position quite naturally, our reluctance to look squarely at death 
and its often unpleasant circumstances may undermine both the rationality 
and the justice of the death-related policies we adopt.
23. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
sec. 24, p. 138.
If the Rawls/Daniels strategy is employed, then, possible practices 
and policies for effecting age rationing, including denial or refusal of 
treatment, senicide, euthanasia, and socially mandated “rational” suicide, 
are to be assessed in terms of whether rational self-interest maximizers 
behind the veil of ignorance would agree to accept such policies or not. 
However, despite the analogy between the lack of specific knowledge 
characteristic of parties to the original position and the lack of specific 
knowledge characteristic of ordinary persons who have not yet reached 
old age or death, what rational self-interest maximizers in the original 
position would agree to cannot be determined simply by inspecting the 
age and death-related choices of ordinary persons now. This is because 
the kinds of choices we ordinary persons make are very heavily determined 
by social expectation and custom, legal and religious restriction, paternalistic 
practices in medicine, financial limitations, and so on. Furthermore, as 
ordinary persons, we may fail both to realize what our own self-interests 
actually are and to choose the most efficient means of satisfying them. 
Consequently, it is necessary to consider— as far as possible independently 
of cultural constraints— what policies for putting age rationing into practice 
the hypothetical rational, self-interest—maximizing persons in the original 
position would accept, given that they have antecedently consented to 
policies assigning enhanced care to the early and middle years but reducing 
care to the aged. Parties to the original position have disenfranchised 
themselves, so to speak; but it remains to be seen what form they would 
agree this disenfranchisement should take.
AGE RATIONING BY DENIAL OF TREATMENT
Although parties to the original position will have already agreed to 
ration health care to the elderly (in order to enhance health care available 
to younger and middle-aged people and, thus, maximize the possibility 
of each person’s reaching a normal life span at all), they must be assumed 
to have enough general information to see what the consequences of 
this antecedent agreement will be. First, under an appropriately thin veil 
of ignorance of this sort, they will know that a given measure of health 
care is not equally effective at all age ranges, but much more effective 
in younger years, much less effective in old age. Because old persons 
typically have more complex medical problems, compounded by a decline 
in the function of many organs and by reduced capacities for healing 
and homeostasis, trade-offs between earlier and later years cannot be 
made on a one-to-one basis: by and large, a unit of medical care consumed 
late in life will have much less effect in preserving life and maintaining 
normal species-typical function than a unit of medical care consumed at 
a younger age. It is this that will have in part induced the rational self­
interest maximizers of the original position to consent to an age-rationing 
policy in the first place; but it will also influence how they choose to put 
an age-rationing policy into effect. Once the multiple infirmities of old 
age begin to erode an individual’s functioning, comparatively larger
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amounts of health care are likely to be required to raise it again. Therapy 
which can successfully maintain comfort, or restore functioning, or preserve 
life may be very much more expensive in older patients, if indeed success 
is possible at all.
Parties to the original position will also know that under a rationing 
scheme it will be necessary, given their antecedent distributive decision, 
to restrict or eliminate most of the comparatively elaborate kinds of care. 
Presumably, if care is to be denied, it will be the highest-cost, least-gain 
varieties of care, including care which does not directly serve to maintain 
life. Of course, “cheap treatment” such as common antibiotics could be 
retained for elderly patients, since these are low cost and, given their 
potential for saving life, high gain; but expensive diagnostic procedures 
and therapies like CAT scans or nuclear magnetic resonance imaging, 
renal dialysis, organ transplants, hip replacements, hydrotherapy, res­
piratory support, total parenteral nutrition, individualized physical therapy, 
vascular grafting, major surgery, and high tech procedures generally 
would be ruled out.24 Hospitalization, and the nearly equally expensive 
inpatient hospice care, might not be permitted, except perhaps briefly; 
sustained nursing home care (at twenty thousand dollars a year) would 
no doubt also be excluded. When the elderly person over an appropriate 
age ceiling or exceeding a predetermined level of deterioration begins 
to show symptoms of a condition more serious than a transitory, easily 
cured illness, he would simply be counted ineligible for treatment. “I’m 
sorry, Mr. Smith,” we can expect the physician to say, “there is nothing 
more we can do.”
Knowing these things, parties to the original position can then assess 
the impact of age rationing by denial of treatment. While they will know 
that age rationing of some of the more expensive, elaborate treatment 
modalities, like renal dialysis and organ transplantation, is now prevalent 
in Britain25 and is to an uneven extent also evident in the United States,26 
they will also understand that under the general age-rationing policy
24. Parties to the original position are not only hypothetical but ahistorical, having 
no knowledge of what historical period they live in. The parties described here, however, 
seem to have an extraordinary amount of information about health care costs in the 1980s. 
But this is simply part of the general information such parties are assumed to have (ibid., 
sec. 24, p. 142); it can be assumed that they also have similarly detailed information about 
health care costs in other historical periods, both before and after the 1980s. Regardless 
of the degree of technological development of medicine in these historical periods, however, 
in all of them providing extensive carenn end-of-life illness is more costly than denying 
care or directly terminating life; hence in all of them the age-rationing problem will look 
very much like it does now.
25. See H. J. Aaron and W. B. Schwartz, The Painful Prescription: Rationing Hospital 
Care (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984) for an account of age rationing in 
Britain.
26. I have in mind non-medically-indicated age ceilings for heart transplants at Stanford, 
waiting lists in the Veterans Administration system for hip replacements, Medicaid’s reduction 
of physical therapy for nursing home patients from twice daily to once daily, and the like.
they have agreed to, the frequency and finality of such denials of treatment 
would be much more severe. Though allocations to the elderly would of 
course be a fluctuating function of scarcity in health care resources as a 
whole, it is probably fair to estimate that were the degree of scarcity 
approximately equivalent to what it is now, a just distribution of health 
care would demand that a very large proportion of all health care expenses 
now devoted to the elderly be reassigned to younger age groups. The 
elderly now use nearly a third of all health care.27 Were these resources 
reassigned to the younger and middle-aged groups, the probability would 
be dramatically increased that all or virtually all these persons (except 
the worst-off newborns and those catastrophically injured or killed outright 
in accidents, homicide, or suicide) would not only reach a normal life 
span but reach it in reasonably good health. Although the temporary 
life expectancy (or average number of years a group of persons at the 
beginning of an age interval will live during that age interval) is already 
very high, especially for the intervals zero to twenty and twenty to forty- 
five,28 it is still the case that a sizable number of people do not reach a 
normal life span or reach it only in poor health.29 Reallocation of substantial 
health care resources would do a great deal to change this, particularly 
if the transfers were used for preventive medicine and support programs, 
such as prenatal nutrition and life-style change, as well as direct assaults 
on specific diseases. But, to achieve this effect, if the degree of overall 
scarcity of medical resources could not be altered, a substantial portion 
of the care now given the elderly would have to be withdrawn. At most, 
perhaps, minimal home hospice care and inexpensive pain relief could 
be routinely granted, together with some superficial care in transient 
acute illness not related to chronic conditions or interdependent diseases. 
But treatment for the elderly could not be escalated very much beyond 
this point if, within a fixed degree of scarcity, a just distribution of resources 
were still to be achieved: if only a significantly lesser portion of the care 
now devoted to the elderly were reassigned to younger age groups, there 
would be no substantial redistributive achievement and no significant 
increase in the propects for persons generally for reaching a normal life 
span. Minimal and erratic age rationing of the sort now practiced in the 
United States would accomplish virtually no redistributive goal at all.
27. Health care expenditures for the elderly were estimated to reach 3.3 percent of 
the GNP in 1984, or nearly a third of the 10.5 percent of the GNP which represents all 
health care. See Daniel R. Waldo and Helen C. Lazenby, “Demographic Characteristics 
and Health Care Use and Expenditures by the Aged in the United States: 1977—1984,” 
Health Care Financing Review 6 (1984): 1-29, p. 8.
28. Olshansky and Ault, pp. 4-5.
29. The “normal life span” is not to be confused with the “average life span,” the 
latter of which 50 percent of the people do not reach and 50 percent exceed. The conception 
of “normal life span” employed by Daniels and others is not defined as a statistical notion 
but appears to have to do with the rough boundary between middle and old age or between 
early old age and late old age.
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In some cases, to deny the elderly treatment beyond minimal home 
hospice care and inexpensive pain relief would simply result in earlier 
deaths. This would, presumably, be the case in many sorts of acute 
conditions— heart attacks or sudden-onset renal failure, for instance— 
where emergency medical intervention is clearly lifesaving. But, especially 
in old age, such starkly life versus death episodes are less likely to occur 
in isolation; it is much more likely that an elderly person will already 
suffer from a number of related or unrelated chronic conditions, each 
of which could be relieved at least to some degree by treatment but which 
together make a fairly substantial and expensive list of complaints. Almost 
half of persons age sixty-five or older suffer from chronic conditions,30 
of which the most frequently reported for the noninstitutionalized elderly 
are arthritis, vision and hearing impairments, heart conditions, and hy­
pertension.31 The elderly over eighty-five in the community average 3.5 
important disabilities per person, and those who are hospitalized 6.0.32 
Some of these chronic conditions are extremely common, like visual 
impairment, arthritis, and loss of hearing, but they are not always in­
expensive to treat. Many of the conditions associated with increasing age, 
like Alzheimer’s disease, certain types of arthritis and cancers, osteoporosis, 
or stroke, may require extended medical, nursing, or rehabilitative care. 
But extended, substantial medical, nursing, and rehabilitative care is 
expensive; consequently, these are precisely the conditions in which, in 
a just health care system under conditions of scarcity, the elderly would 
be denied care.
Clearly, even hypothetical parties to the original position, under an 
appropriately thin veil of ignorance, will be dismayed by the consequences 
of the initial distributive decision they have made. Total hip replacements, 
for instance, could no longer be offered the elderly; but it will be evident 
that there is a substantial difference in the character of life for an elderly 
person who remains ambulatory and one no longer able to walk. It will 
be evident, too, that the person who needs, but does not get, a pacemaker 
or a coronary bypass may lead a quite restricted life, seriously limited in 
his activities, and that life with renal failure or cardiac arrhythmias or 
pulmonary insufficiency can be restrictive, painful, or frightening. Indeed, 
what may be most dismaying to those peering through this thin veil of 
ignorance is that elderly persons who are not allocated treatment do not 
simply die; rather, they suffer their illness and disabilities without adequate 
aid. Even symptom control in conditions like cancer, if not simply oblit- 
erative of consciousness, can b£ quite expensive, since effective relief 
may require constant titration and monitoring; if so, it too would pre­
sumably be ruled out. Worse still, common antibiotics and the few other
30. See Charles R. Fisher, “Differences by Age Groups in Health Care Spending,” 
Health Care Financing Review 2 (Spring 1980): 65—90, p. 69, fig. 1.
31. John K. Iglehart, “The Cost of Keeping the Elderly Well,” National Journal 12 
(October 23, 1978): 1728-31, p. 1729.
32. Rowe, p. 830.
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kinds of cheap treatment that would still be available may simply serve 
to prolong this period of decline, not to reduce its discomforts, while 
labor-intensive care that might make it tolerable— like physical therapy 
or psychiatric support and counseling— would also be ruled out. To deny 
treatment does not always simply bring about earlier deaths that maximal 
care would postpone; denial of treatment also means denial of expensive 
palliative measures, both physical and psychological, which maximal care 
would permit at whatever age death occurs.
Nor can it be supposed that to deny care to the elderly is to simply 
allow them to die as their fathers and forefathers did; to deny care now 
is to subject persons to a medically new situation. Not only has it been 
comparatively unlikely until quite recently that a person would reach old 
age at all (in the United States, life expectancy at birth in 1900 was only 
47.3 years, compared to 74.5 in 1982),33 but in the past most deaths were 
caused by parasitic and infectious diseases, many of which were rather 
rapidly fatal. Modern sanitation, inoculation, and antibiotic therapy have 
changed that, and for the first time the specter of old age as a constellation 
of various sublethal but severely limiting and discomforting conditions 
has become the norm. Hence, any notion that denial of treatment to the 
elderly will simply allow a return to the more “natural” modes of death 
enjoyed by earlier, simpler generations is a dangerously romanticized 
misconception. To ration health care by denial of treatment is not simply 
to abandon the patient to death but, often, to abandon him to a prolonged 
period of morbidity, only later followed by death.
But, of course, this is a prospect which the rational self-interest 
maximizer, behind the veil of ignorance about whether he himself will 
succumb quickly in an acute crisis or be consigned without substantial 
medical assistance to a long-term decline, will be concerned to protect 
against. Parties to the original position will thus find many reasons to 
reject policies which ration health care by denying treatment to the aged; 
the question for them will be whether they can devise better alternative 
methods.
SQUARING THE CURVE
Since the publication in 1980 of James Fries’s provocative article on the 
compression of morbidity,34 there has been a good deal of discussion of 
the prospects for the reduction of senescence, or the end-of-life morbidity 
characteristic of old age. Although the average life span in the United 
States has increased by more than twenty-seven years between 1900 and 
the present, as Fries points out, the maximum life span has not increased; 
there is no greater percentage of centenarians, for instance, and there 
are no documented cases of survival, he claims, beyond 114 years. The
33. See Waldo and Lazenby, p. 2.
34. James F. Fries, “Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 303 (July 17, 1980): 130-35.
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Fig. 1.—Fries’s increasingly rectangular survival curve. About 80 percent (stippled 
area) of the difference between the 1900 curve and the ideal curve had been eliminated 
by 1980. Trauma is now the dominant cause of death in early life. (From James F. Fries, 
“Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity,” New England Journal of Medicine 
303 [July 17, 1980]: 131, fig. 2.)
result is an increasingly “rectangularized” mortality curve, as more and 
more people reach old age but the maximum old age is not extended. 
Furthermore, since this rectangularization results from postponement 
of the onset of chronic illness, it means an increasingly rectangularized 
morbidity curve as well. On this basis, Fries optimistically predicts that 
the number of extremely old persons will not increase, that the average 
period of diminished physical vigor or senescence will decrease, that 
chronic disease will occupy a smaller proportion of the typical life span, 
and that the need for medical care in late life will decrease. Good health, 
in short, will extend closer and closer to the ideal average life span of 
about eighty-five, but life will not be extended much beyond this point 
(see fig. 1).
Fries’s conclusions about “squaring the curve,” as it is often called, 
have been vigorously disputed by Schneider and Brody,35 among others. 
They see no evidence of declining morbidity and disability in any age 
group, particularly those just prior to old age, but they do observe that 
increasing numbers of people are reaching advanced ages and point out 
that this fast-growing segment of the population is the one most vulnerable 
to chronic disease. While some writers set the biologic limit to the human 
life span at about one hundred, much higher than Fries’s original estimate 
of eighty-five, others believe that there is no such limit. In either case, 
most of these comparatively pessimistic writers fear that a large increase 
in the number of individuals who reach old age will mean a large increase
35. Edward L. Schneider and Jacob A. Brody, “Aging, Natural Death, and the Com­
pression of Morbidity: Another View,” New England Journal of Medicine 309 (October 6, 
1983): 854-55.
in the number of persons who spend long proportions of their lives 
afflicted with chronic disease. Advances in medicine will, they believe, 
prolong old age rather than delay its onset.
Clearly this issue is one with enormous consequences for health care 
planning. But it has been debated as an empirical issue only; nowhere 
has it been recognized that the empirical question cloaks a central moral 
issue as well. What is crucial to note is that both the optimistic and 
pessimistic parties to this dispute agree, or tacitly agree, on one thing: 
that a squared morbidity curve is a desirable thing. This is by no means 
surprising: the squared curve represents a situation in which life is, as 
Fries puts it, “physically, emotionally, and intellectually vigorous until 
just before its close.”36 Death without illness, or without sustained, long­
term illness, rational self-interest maximizers would surely agree, is a 
desirable thing. But if this is so, the empirical disagreement between the 
optimists and the pessimists grows irrelevant. For regardless of whether 
or not changes in life-style or improvements in medical care would naturally 
flatten or square the mortality and morbidity curves, these curves can 
also be deliberately altered by other distributive and policy-based inter­
ventions as well— including those which implement age-rationing schemes.
As seen in the previous section, rationing which proceeds by denial 
of treatment may have the effect of not only hastening both the onset 
and termination of the drop-off or downhill slope of the morbidity 
curve— patients become impaired earlier and die sooner—but also in 
many cases flattening this downslope: the period of senescence, or chronic 
old-age disability, occupies a longer proportion of life, since it is endured 
without treatment. The morally significant feature of rationing policies 
which deny treatment is not simply their effect on mortality rates but 
their effect on the ways in which people die (see fig. 2).
But the curve can also be artificially squared—by deliberately bringing 
about death before the onset of serious morbidity, while the quality of 
life remains comparatively high. This too means that the onset and ter­
mination of the drop-off slope are both earlier— the termination a good 
deal earlier— but the slope itself is now perpendicular, not gradual, and 
life is terminated with only incipient decline. This is precisely the effect 
of the primitive and historical practices mentioned earlier: senicide, eu­
thanasia, and socially mandated “rational” suicide, at least where they 
are practiced early in the downhill course of a long-term degenerative 
disease. The squared curve will be produced, of course, by denial of 
treatment in sudden-onset life-threatening conditions, but these are much 
less characteristic of old age, and the more frequent effect of denying 
treatment is a flattened, prolonged decline. Practices which guarantee a 
squared curve, on the other hand, involve direct killing and, in particular, 
killing of persons whose quality of life is still comparatively high; never-
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Perfect Health
F i g . 2.—The effect of denying treatment in old age. Solid line shows morbidity curve 
characteristic for a representative individual where treatment is supplied; dotted line shows 
conjectural morbidity curve where treatment is denied after age sixty-five in sublethal 
chronic conditions.
theless, these practices do achieve what is agreed by all to be desirable, 
namely, death without prior sustained, long-term disease (see fig. 3).
Under the assumptions employed here, parties to the original position 
have antecedently contracted for age-rationing policies, even though 
these will have the effect of reducing the remaining length of life for 
those who reach old age. In virtue of this initial agreement, these parties
Perfect Health
Age
Fig. 3.—Morbidity curve in direct-termination practices. Solid line shows morbidity 
curve in old age with treatment, dashed line without treatment after sixty-five, and dotted 
line shows conjectural morbidity curve in direct-termination practices such as senicide, 
early euthanasia, and culturally mandated “rational” suicide, displaying early redistributive 
gain.
are now also in a position to agree upon the sorts of policies by means 
of which this age rationing will be put into effect. Hence, they must 
choose between treatment-denying policies and those which impose death; 
constrained by their earlier decision in favor of age rationing, they no 
longer have the option of choosing policies which allocate extensive re­
sources to the elderly and thus make possible the extension of life. To 
put it in the familiar terms of bioethics, they must choose between policies 
which involve “killing” and those which involve “allowing to die,” and 
their agreement will serve to identify which policy is more just.
For the most part, the age-rationing practices now followed in Britain 
and the United States as well as elsewhere involve denial of treatment, 
for instance, in the form of age ceilings for organ transplants, renal 
dialysis, or joint replacement. But I wish to argue that rational self­
interest maximizers in the original position would prefer the direct-killing 
practices which are the contemporary analogues of the historical and 
primitive practices of senicide, early euthanasia, and culturally encouraged 
suicide to those which involve allowing to die. Parties to the original 
position, after all, are fully informed about the possible societal conse­
quences of their choices (except about the impact on themselves) and 
are not hesitant— as rational persons— to look the circumstances of death 
squarely in the face. There are, I think, two principal reasons why they 
would agree on direct-termination policies involving the causing of death, 
that is, on “squaring the curve.”
Avoidance of Suffering
Except for persons who believe, on religious or other grounds, that 
suffering is of intrinsic merit or is of extrinsic value in attaining salvation 
or some other valued goal, rational persons eager to maximize their self­
interests seek to avoid discomfort, disability, and pain. Of course, a good 
deal of suffering may willingly be endured by those who hope to survive 
a critical episode and return to a more normal condition of life; but 
terminal suffering known to be terminal is not prized. In medical situations 
where the prognosis is uncertain and sophisticated techniques are employed 
to support survival, the risk of suffering is one the rational person may 
well wish to take, since the odds of survival may be either unknown or 
large enough to make it worth the risk. But under an age-rationing 
system which proceeds by denial of treatment, medical support will be 
minimal and, hence, comparatively ineffective in supporting survival; 
the chance of survival of an episode of illness is thereby drastically reduced. 
Thus, the possible gains to be achieved by enduring suffering disappear. 
Willingness to endure suffering may be a prudent, self-interest-favoring 
posture in a medical climate in which support is provided— even if that 
support is erratic or the chance of success is unknown— but it is not a 
prudent posture where age rationing precludes nearly all such support 
across the board.
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Parties to the original position will also give preference to a policy which 
involves an overall distributive gain, benefiting all but giving the greatest 
benefit to the least advantaged. Since the allocation of resources may 
affect the overall total of resources available, they will prefer policies 
which maximize resources in a just distribution, and it is this that “squaring 
the curve” would accomplish. Of course, individuals surveying the possibility 
of policies which permit or require the direct termination of the existence 
of human beings may believe that their lives are to be sacrificed in the 
interests of other, younger people, and were this the case they would 
rightly resist this sort of utilitarian trade-off. But individuals who view 
these prospective policies in this way make a fundamental error: they 
view the effects of these policies from their own immediate perspective 
only and fail to see the larger impact these policies have. Quite the 
contrary, the overall effect of direct-termination policies is to maximize 
the preservation of life, not reduce it. This is a function of the fact, as 
pointed out earlier, that medical care is less efficient in old age, more 
efficient at younger ages, and that a unit of medical care consumed late 
in life will have much less effect in preserving life and maintaining normal 
species-typical function than a unit of medical care consumed at a younger 
age. The effect of rationing policies which allocate care away from elderly 
persons to younger ones is to increase the effectiveness of these resources, 
and thus greatly increase the chances for younger persons to reach a 
normal life span. Of course, since mortality in the zero to twenty and 
twenty to forty-five age ranges is already quite low, the increase in temporary 
life expectancy will be greatest for those forty-five to sixty-five; but, it 
must be remembered, the veil of ignorance for those in the original 
position excludes all but the vaguest knowledge of likelihoods of their 
own positions,37 and any possibly preventable mortality or morbidity in 
these younger age ranges will constitute a situation rational self-interest 
maximizers will work to avoid.
Furthermore, and for the same reasons of efficiency, the reallocation 
decreases by a much smaller amount the chances for older persons to 
live beyond a normal life span, since after all those chances were never 
very great. For example, ten units of medical care given to a ninety-two- 
year-old man with multiple chronic conditions might make it possible 
for him to live an additional two years, but ten units of care given to an 
eight-year-old girl in an acute episode might make it possible for her to 
live a normal life span, or about sixty-four additional years. The mistake 
the disgruntled elderly individual facing a rationing-mandated death 
makes is in failing to calculate not only the immediate loss he faces but 
also the benefit he has already gained from policies which have enhanced 
his chances of reaching his current age: his temporary life expectancy 
in the ranges zero to twenty, twenty to forty-five, and forty-five to sixty-
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five will have been much elevated, even though his total life expectancy 
may decline. The less care provided at the end of life and, hence, the 
greater the amount of transfer to earlier ages, the greater his gain in life 
prospects will have been. (Of course, this effect could not be achieved 
in the first generation of the implementation of such policies.) Furthermore, 
direct-termination policies are more effective in maximizing overall gains 
in life saved than denial-of-treatment policies. Since denial of treatment 
still always involves some costs as persons with multiple conditions in 
interrelated degenerative diseases are granted even minimal hospice and 
palliative care during their downhill courses, the proportion of savings 
is smaller, and less is transferred to earlier age groups.
Consequently, the disgruntled individual also makes a second mistake: 
he fails to see that because direct termination rather than denial of 
treatment maximizes the amount of transfer to younger age groups, such 
a policy will have maximized his own chances (except in the first generation) 
not just of reaching old age but also of entering it with fewer chronic, 
preexisting conditions. Furthermore, this policy will have done the same 
for all other persons as well. But as the number of persons entering old 
age with chronic conditions decreases, the normal life span will tend to 
increase (at least to any natural limit there may be) and, with it, the 
chances of any individual’s reaching this mark. The long-term effect of 
such policies— despite the fact that they involve deliberately causing 
death in people who might continue to live— is to gradually increase the 
normal life span by delaying the onset of seriously debilitating and even­
tually fatal disease.
The rational person in the original position, then, who counts among 
his self-interests both the avoidance of suffering and the preservation of 
his life, will correctly see that social policies providing for the direct 
termination of his life at the onset of substantial morbidity in old age 
will more greatly enhance his prospects in satisfying these self-interests 
than any alternative open in a scarcity situation. After all, as a party to 
the original position, he has no knowledge of his own medical condition 
or age at any given time. Of course, if there were no benefits to older 
as well as to younger persons from this reallocation but, rather, merely 
the sacrifice of the interests of some people for those of others, parties 
to the original position could not agree to such policies; but this is not 
the case. Since such policies do provide benefits for all, and indeed the 
greatest benefits for the least advantaged (i.e., those who would otherwise 
die young), they will receive the agreement of all rational persons in the 
original position. This agreement, then, provides the basis for counting 
such policies just.
ATTITUDES TOWARD DIRECT-TERMINATION 
AGE RATIONING
But of course, the rational self-interest maximizer in the original position 
can consent only to policies which are psychologically benign and which
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do not impose lifelong anguish or fear; this is because parties to the 
original position are rational in the sense that they will not enter into 
agreements they know they cannot keep or can do so only with great 
difficulty.38 Age-rationing policies which involve direct killing of the elderly 
may seem to invite just such anguish, as one cowers a lifetime in fear of 
being brutally extinguished by the unscrupulous physician or the naked 
power of the state. Certainly some of the primitive and historical policies 
mentioned earlier have engendered just this sort of fear: the early Nazi 
“euthanasia” program, though reserved for Aryans and initially performed 
with relatives’ consent, comes to mind.
Nevertheless, whether death in old age is feared or welcomed is very 
much a product of social beliefs and expectations, and these not only 
undergo spontaneous transformations but can be quite readily altered 
and engineered.39 Transformations in social practices in earlier historical 
periods make it evident that beliefs about whether there is such a thing 
as a time to die can change; transformation can be equally well imagined 
in the present. Aristotle’s dictum notwithstanding, whether death is believed 
to be the worst of evils, or whether some circumstances— say, extreme 
incapacitation, inability to communicate, or continuous pain—are believed 
to be worse than death is much influenced by the surrounding society. 
Mary Rose Barrington speculates about an attitudinal change which, in 
the contemporary cost-conscious climate, seems an increasingly real pos­
sibility: “What if a time came when, no longer able to look after oneself, 
the decision to live on for the maximum number of years were considered 
a mark of heedless egoism? What if it were to be thought that dulce et 
decorum est pro familia mori?”40
Many sorts of prevailing social expectations serving the interests of 
society at large, and hence the long-term interests of individuals, are 
readily cooperated with, even at some immediate and direct cost to the 
individuals involved: for example, expectations about getting married, 
pursuing careers, supporting children, and so on. All of these involve a 
good deal of societal and institutional support. Marriage is encouraged 
in part by elaborate ceremonies and religious services; universities and 
technical schools not only provide employment skills but also socialize 
students to want to pursue careers; the support of children is enforced 
not only by legal penalties for failure to do so but also by extremely 
strong social sanctions. It is not at all difficult to imagine the development 
of social expectations around the notion that there is a time to die, or, 
indeed, that it is a matter of virtue or obligation to choose to die.41 To 
be effective, these expectations would presumably be coupled with sup­
38. Ibid., p. 145.
39. See my “Manipulated Suicide,” in Suicide: The Philosophical Issues, ed. M. Pabst 
Battin and David J. Mayo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp. 172-73.
40. M. R. Barringon, “Apologia for Suicide,” in Battin and Mayo, eds., p. 97.
41. Battin, pp. 172-73 ff.
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portive social practices— for instance, predeath counseling, physician 
assistance in providing the actual means of inducing death, or ceremonial 
recognition from such institutions as churches. Clearly, societal expectations 
concerning the time to die need not be dysphoric or condemn the members 
of an age-rationing society to lifetimes of anguish or fear. Indeed, Daniels 
suggests that a view very like this characterized Aleut society: “The elderly, 
or the enfeebled elderly, are sent off to die, sparing the rest of the 
community from the burden of sustaining them. From descriptions of 
the practice, the elderly quite willingly accept this fate, and it is fair that 
they should.”42
Nor need direct-termination rationing policies be viewed as a violation 
of rights. In an age-rationing society there is no right to live maximally 
on, nor to receive the necessary medical care. Of course, an individual 
may have rights to many sorts of things even in a society which rations 
by age— for instance, a right to termination procedures which are dignified 
and humane. A person will also have rights to freedom from abuse (to 
be discussed in the next section). And it will also be the case that younger 
persons have rights to medical care and the prolongation of life. Con­
sequently, direct-termination age-rationing policies, fairly applied, would 
not violate that Rawlsian principle of justice which stipulates that each 
person has an equal right to basic rights and liberties compatible with 
equal rights and liberties for all, since each person will have had an equal 
right to medical prolongation of life and equal liberty to live in his 
younger and middle years, and each person will be equally subject to 
the expectation that his life shall come to an end before sustained terminal 
morbidity sets in. This policy does not entail that elderly people no longer 
have rights; they continue to enjoy the rights of persons in society, but 
the right to extensive medical continuation of their lives is not among 
them.
THE ISSUE OF ABUSE
Not only would rational self-interest maximizers in the original position 
require that any direct-termination rationing policies adopted neither be 
dysphoric in their application nor violate rights, but they will also require 
that these policies not invite abuse. To abuse a policy includes using it 
not only to cause harms to individuals but also to alter the practices it 
permits in such a way as to render the policy itself inherently unstable. 
Needless to say, virtually any policy can be abused; but some policies 
invite abuse in a much stronger way, and policies permitting or requiring 
direct killing may seem to make the strongest possible invitation of all. 
The issue, then, is whether parties to the original position could devise 
direct-termination policies which resist abuse or provide adequate pro­
tection against it.
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Direct-termination age-rationing policies would need to incorporate 
at least three features as protections against abuse. Without these features, 
rational self-interest maximizers in the original position could not consent 
to them.
Preservation of Choice
First, compliance with direct-termination policies would need to be ex­
perienced as essentially voluntary at the level of individual choice. This 
does not mean that individual choice would not be shaped by more 
general social expectations, but the individual could not be coerced, 
either legally or socially, into ending his life. Any individual who chose 
to resist the social expectation that it is time to die, and hence to endure 
the disenfranchisement from treatment that would be his lot, would have 
to be guaranteed the freedom to do so. Hence, in such a world, it could 
not be said that the ill, elderly individual has a “duty to die”; what he 
has is a duty to refrain from further use of medical resources. He may 
then think it prudent to avail himself of the support in direct, painless 
termination of his life that such a society would offer, instead of finding 
himself abandoned to die without substantial medical help; but of course 
conceptions of prudence may vary from one individual to another. Indeed, 
if social acceptance of direct-termination policies were widespread enough 
to yield sufficient redistributive savings, this would perhaps permit giving 
those few persons who chose to tough it out additional medical care; this 
would further underscore the voluntary nature of response to a direct- 
termination social expectation. Preservation of choice is crucial because 
state or social coercion not only causes harms but also invites rebellion; 
it is inherently unstable. But the justice of age rationing in the first place 
depends on stable enough functioning of the scheme so that the distributive 
gains in overall life prospects are actually realized, and a scheme which 
is clearly unstable enough to make such redistributive effects impossible 
cannot be said to be just.
Rejection of a Fixed Age of Death
Second, the timing of direct-termination rationing policies must be based 
on expected time left until death, not on a fixed cutoff age such as sixty- 
five (as on the Greek island of Ceos), seventy-two (the approximate average 
life expectancy), eighty-five (Fries’s conjecture)— or, for that matter, any 
other fixed age. This is because the underlying purpose of rationing is 
to enhance the length of life span for all members of society; though it 
will most greatly benefit those who now die earliest, it must also benefit 
the elderly as well. The central mechanism of redistributive age rationing 
is reallocation of treatment from older years to younger ones, where 
treatment is more efficacious and where the prospects of a longer life 
span are enhanced for all, especially for those whose life spans would 
otherwise be quite short. But if a fixed age cutoff point for the elderly 
were selected, whereby persons below that cutoff receive full treatment
and persons above it were expected to end their lives, the fundamental 
purpose of rationing would be undermined. The use of a fixed-age cutoff 
point would be extraordinarily inefficient, since it would allocate some 
resources to persons on a clearly terminal course, where the possibility 
of extension of life is small, and it would also exterminate life where 
there was no medical treatment required to sustain it. It is not old age 
itself which is medically expensive; it is the last month, six months, or 
year or two of life. Variations in costs and efficacy of treatment are not 
so much a function of time since birth as time to death.43 Many octo­
genarians are vigorously healthy; so are some people in their nineties 
and beyond. On the other hand, dying can be expensive and medical 
efforts futile even for those whose ages are not advanced. Still more 
important, avoidance of a fixed-age cutoff point protects the health care 
system from political encroachments, particularly those which seek cost 
containment or other political objectives by adjusting the cutoff age 
downward.
Consequently, parties to the original position would not favor a 
fixed-age rationing policy but, rather, one which, depending on the degree 
of scarcity, encouraged direct termination via senicide, early euthanasia, 
or rational suicide only during the last month, half-year, or year of life. 
Of course, the precise ante-mortem period can be identified with certainty 
only retrospectively. However, even this does not constitute a fully effective 
counterargument, since it is usually possible for the experienced physician 
to recognize with at least a fair degree of accuracy the onset of what is 
likely to be a downhill course ending in death— especially in an elderly 
patient. Nevertheless, even if such predictions are sometimes inaccurate, 
the rational self-interest maximizer will still prefer reliance on them in 
order to maximize his opportunities for continuing life and normal func­
tioning, something which would be jeopardized much more severely by 
a rigid age cutoff.
Furthermore, since some declines are comparatively rapid, even if 
not instantaneous, and some prolonged, parties to the original position 
will seek to maximize their overall opportunities not by agreeing to a 
policy in which a fixed amount of time at the end of life is held ineligible 
for care and in which direct termination may be practiced but by supporting 
a policy in which disenfranchisement begins only at the onset of profound 
illness or irremediable chronic disease. After all, the precise duration of 
a downhill course can rarely be predicted with accuracy, although it can 
typically be accurately predicted that the course will indeed be downhill. 
Consequently, parties to the original position will consent to policies 
which impose disenfranchisement not long after the diagnosis and onset 
of symptoms of an eventually terminal disease, or at least long enough 
after the onset to confirm the diagnosis and for the need for medical
43. Victor Fuchs, “ ‘Though Much Is Taken’: Reflections on Aging, Health, and Medical 
Care,” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly I Health and Society 62 (1984): 143—66, pp. 151—52.
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care to have become pronounced. Hence, the curve would in fact never 
be perfectly squared, and individuals would not have their lives discontinued 
while they remained in full health, but the timing of disenfranchisement 
from care and the expectation that it is “time to die” would fall just after 
the onset of a characteristic downhill course. Just how far down this slope 
the cutoff point might come would be a function, of course, of the scarcity 
situation itself and also of individual, voluntary choices mentioned above.
Public Awareness
Third, it is crucial that not only parties to the original position but also 
actual persons affected by such policies both know the policies and un­
derstand the rationale for them; secretive or propagandistic policies cannot 
be rationally chosen, nor can ill-founded ones. It is crucial for the stability 
and, hence, justice of “time to die” policies that persons affected by them 
understand their own distributive gain; without this understanding, they 
will remain in the posture of the disgruntled individual mentioned above, 
who sees only his own loss. But individuals who see only their own losses 
under a policy constitute a force for change. This in turn renders the 
policy itself in practice unstable, and an unstable policy cannot operate 
in a way to produce a just distribution. It is crucial that the man in the 
street who reaches old age understands that the very fact that he has 
been able to do so is in part the product of his cooperation with policies 
which have him accept the claim that it is time to die when serious 
morbidity sets in. As said earlier, the rational person will choose policies 
which promise both freedom from pain and as long a life as possible; it 
is only if the man in the street understands the theory and the operations 
of the policy that he too will be able to see that it accomplishes both.
CONCLUSION: A WARNING
This argument, that in an age-rationing system direct termination of the 
lives of the elderly more nearly achieves justice than denying them treat­
ment, may seem to be a reductio, but it is not. In a society characterized 
by substantial scarcity of resources, this contemporary analogue of ancient 
practices is the only fair response. However, this view does not—repeat, 
NOT— entail that contemporary society should impose age rationing or 
exterminate those among its elderly who are in poor health. For one 
thing, it is by no means clear that rationing either by denial of treatment 
or direct termination is better than providing full medical care for all 
the elderly who wish it, even at the expense of other social goods. Age 
rationing is a rationally defensible policy only if the alleged scarcity is 
real and cannot be relieved without introducing still greater injustices. 
But it may well be that the very scarcity assumption which gives rise to 
the issue of justice in health care in the first place is not accurate. Certainly 
some of the pressure on resources could be reduced by pruning waste 
and by greater attention to patients’ actual desires, reducing the rather 
substantial amount of health care expense attributable to the paternalistic
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imposition of treatment and to “defensive medicine” practices by physicians 
seeking to protect themselves from legal liability. More important, the 
degree of scarcity in health care resources is itself a function of larger 
distributive choices among various kinds of social goods, including ed­
ucation, art, defense, welfare, and so on; the position of contemporary 
society does not resemble the economically precarious position of most 
of the primitive societies in which direct-termination practices have de­
veloped. Consequently, the appropriate-response to the apparent cost- 
containment crisis in health care is not necessarily to devise just policies 
for enacting rationing, by age or in any other way, but to reconsider the 
societal priorities assigned various social goods. Given a world very much 
like the present one, it may be asked, what ceiling would parties in the 
original position assign to health care? This might obviate the necessity 
for rationing at all.
Second, a redistributive policy cannot be just without adequate guar­
antees that resources will in fact be redistributed as required. To deprive 
the elderly of health care without reassigning the savings in the form of 
health care for younger age groups is not just and ought not to be 
advertised in this way. Inasmuch as the erratic age rationing practiced 
in the United States (perhaps unlike that in a closed system, such as 
within the British National Health Service)44 is not tied directly to re­
distribution of this care to others, it can hardly be described as just but, 
rather, as the product of ordinary, socially entrenched age bias. Fur­
thermore, a just rationing system requires a background of just institutions 
to ensure its operation, and neither the United States nor Britain can 
boast a full set of these— nor, for that matter, can any of the primitive 
or historical societies mentioned at the outset. Consequently, although 
I believe there is a cogent argument for the moral preferability of a quite 
startling form of age rationing in a scarcity situation— voluntary but 
socially encouraged killing or self-killing of the elderly as their infirmities 
overcome them, in preference to the medical abandonment they would 
otherwise face— this is in no way a recommendation for the introduction 
of such practices in our present world. As Daniels remarks, if the basic 
institutions of a given society do not comply with acceptable principles 
of distributive justice, then rationing by age may make things worse45— 
and surely age rationing by direct-termination practices could make things 
very much worse indeed. Thus, while this paper argues that direct-ter­
mination practices would be just in a scarcity-characterized ideal world, 
it casts a quite skeptical eye on the sorts of arbitrary, unthinking age 
rationing we are toying with now.
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